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The Role of Appraisal in Emotion 
The idea that appraisal plays a role in emotion can be traced back to Aristotle, 
Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume, who considered it self-evident that the states variously called 
passions, affects, or emotions are differentiated by the type of evaluation or judgment a 
person makes of the eliciting event. This shared conviction was shattered by James' 
(1884/1968) claim that "that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting 
fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion". While James 
meant “feeling” when he wrote "emotion" and he later acknowledged that the nature of the 
bodily changes was determined by the overwhelming "idea" of the significance of a situation 
for well-being (e.g., the probability that the bear will kill us or that we will kill it; James, 
1894, p. 518), a century of debate and misunderstanding was launched (Ellsworth, 1994). 
Appraisal did not play much of a role in this debate nor did it in the (biological versions of) 
basic emotion theories, pioneered by Tomkins (1962) and his disciples Ekman (1972) and 
Izard (1977), which dominated the emotion domain from the 60s to the 80s.  
The term appraisal was first used in a technical sense by Arnold (1960) and Lazarus 
(1966). Detailed development of this notion only occurred in the early 80s (Scherer, 1999; 
Schorr, 2001) leading to what is now referred to as appraisal theories. Theorists in this 
tradition propose that most, but not all, emotions are elicited and differentiated by people’s 
evaluation of the significance of events for their well-being (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). 
Currently, many contemporary emotion theories mention appraisal. For instance, Ekman 
(2004, p. 121-126) postulated "automatic appraisal mechanisms" as triggers of emotion. 
Barrett (2006) suggested that appraisal can play a role in the generation of core affect and 
Russell (2003) suggested that appraisal may be one of several independent components of an 
emotion episode. Yet, not all theories that mention appraisal qualify as appraisal theories. In 
the present chapter, we propose two related criteria for a theory to count as an appraisal 
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theory: (a) appraisal theories consider appraisal as a typical cause of emotion (or of emotional 
components), and because of this, (b) appraisal is the core determinant of the content of 
feelings. Before addressing the relation between appraisal and emotion, we consider 
definitions of the terms emotion and appraisal. This is crucial because the definitions that one 
has of these concepts determine in part how one thinks of the relation between them. In 
addition to commonalities among appraisal theories, we also highlight their differences.  
Definition of Emotion 
The lack of an agreed upon definition of the term emotion has led to serious 
misunderstandings. We need to briefly address this issue and mark our position. The set of 
emotions can be defined with an intensional definition. Such a definition lists the necessary 
and sufficient conditions or criteria for an emotion exemplar to belong to the set and they 
demarcate the set from particular other sets such as moods, attitudes, reflexes, and personality 
traits. A first set of criteria that often turns up in the literature has to do with duration. 
Emotion theorists agree that emotions are episodes (i.e., phenomena with a beginning and an 
end) and not enduring states. Although they vary in duration, they are usually short lived. 
These criteria serve to distinguish emotions from personality traits and moods.  
A second set of criteria is that emotions consist of multiple components, or better, 
changes in multiple components. Many theorists include a cognitive component, a 
motivational one, a somatic one, a motor one, and a subjective one. Components (or parts of 
them) have been linked to functions. The cognitive component consists of an appraisal 
process, whose function is to evaluate the implications of stimuli for well-being. The 
motivational component consists of action tendencies (e.g., to increase contact) and other 
forms of action readiness (e.g., passivity). The somatic component consists of physiological 
activity, both central (in the brain) and peripheral (outside the brain). The motivational and 
somatic components have the function to prepare and support behavior. In fact, the central 
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part of the somatic component supports all components. The motor component consists of 
facial and vocal expressions and gross behavior (e.g., fleeing, fighting, repairing) and has the 
function to execute behavior. Finally, the subjective component consists of experience or 
feelings, and has been endowed with a monitoring function (and other functions associated 
with consciousness). Theorists differ in how many and which of these components (or parts 
of components) they require to be present and whether these need to be synchronized, in 
order to talk about an emotion. For instance, some authors (e.g., Scherer, 1984; Mulligan & 
Scherer, in press) exclude gross behavior, considering it as a consequence of emotion. Some 
authors (e.g., Parrott, 2007) exclude central somatic activity because it is present, on a lower 
level of analysis, in all the other components. Some authors (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2000) 
have added other cognitive processes in addition to appraisal, such as changes in attention 
and memory, and categorization and labeling of one’s emotion. The presence of certain 
components serves to differentiate emotions from other phenomena such as attitudes or 
preferences (these are said to lack the somatic and motor components) and reflexes (these are 
said to lack a cognitive component).  
A third set of criteria has to do with the content or the properties of certain 
components. Appraisal theorists have argued that emotions occur when stimuli are appraised 
as goal relevant, goal congruent/incongruent, positive/negative, novel and/or urgent (Scherer, 
2005; Frijda, 1986). Some theorists (Ortony & Turner, 1990) have argued that the feeling 
component of emotions must have a positive or negative valence (excluding surprise and 
interest from the set of emotions). Others (Frijda, 2007) have argued that the action 
tendencies in emotions have control precedence: They demand priority over other action 
tendencies. A fourth criterion proposed by Scherer (2001, 2009) is that emotions are, more 
than other phenomena, characterized by a high degree of integration and synchronization 
among all components. A fifth criterion emphasized by philosophers (e.g., de Sousa, 1987; 
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Solomon, 1984) is that emotions have the property of intentionality (in the philosophical 
sense of the term). This means that they are directed toward something beyond themselves, 
that they have an object (e.g., being angry at someone, or being afraid of something). This 
criterion differentiates emotions from purely physical sensations (e.g., pain) that are not about 
something.  
Definition of Appraisal 
Since Arnold (1960) first used the term appraisal in the context of emotion, there has 
been an evolution in the way in which theorists have used it. We therefore think it is 
important to present and justify our own definition of appraisal, which is neither limited to 
higher-order cognitive processes, nor over-inclusive (to refute the most frequent criticisms of 
appraisal theories). The singular use (appraisal) refers to the appraisal process and the plural 
use (appraisals) to the values that form the output of this process. We discuss both below.  
Appraisal Process 
To arrive at an intensional definition of the appraisal process, we rely on Marr’s 
(1982) proposal that any process can be described at three levels of analysis. At the functional 
level, a process is described as the relation between an input and an output. For example, the 
process of adding digits can be described as the relation between two digits and their sum. At 
this level can also be specified the conditions under which the process takes place, such as the 
presence or absence of consciousness, processing goals, attentional capacity, and time. At the 
algorithmic level, the mechanisms and format of the representations (i.e., codes) are specified 
that are involved in translating the input into the output. Adding digits can be done by a rule-
based process, like counting the units in both digits, or it can be done by an associative 
process, that is, by retrieving a previously calculated and stored sum. The format of the 
representations can be verbal-like vs. image-like and localist vs. distributed. At the 
implementational level, the process is described in terms of areas or circuits of brain activity.  
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We propose an intensional definition of appraisal at the functional level (cf. Moors, 
2010). That is, we demarcate the appraisal process from other processes on the basis of the 
content of its input and/or output. The appraisal process takes a stimulus (as its input) and 
produces (as its output) values for one or more appraisal factors (e.g., goal relevance, goal 
congruence, coping potential, expectancy). This definition is not all-inclusive. It does not 
include processes that produce a value for other factors than appraisal factors (e.g., size, 
length, gender, location, color).  
A first implication of defining appraisal in terms of input and/or output is that 
appraisal is not confined to operate under a specific set of conditions. Appraisal theorists 
have argued from the very start (e.g., Arnold, 1960) that appraisal can and often does operate 
automatically. This means that it can operate in the absence of a conscious stimulus input, the 
absence of a goal to engage in the process, the absence of abundant attentional capacity, the 
absence of abundant time, and/or despite the presence of a goal to counteract the process.  
A second implication of defining appraisal on the functional level is that we do not 
confine appraisal to one single mechanism or to one format of representations on the 
algorithmic level. Any mechanism that produces values for one or more appraisal factors is 
accepted as a valid mechanism underlying appraisal. Appraisal theorists have proposed two 
or three possible mechanisms: a rule-based mechanism, an associative mechanism, and 
sometimes also a sensory-motor mechanism (Clore & Ortony, 2000, 2008; Leventhal & 
Scherer, 1987; C. A. Smith & Kirby, 2000, 2001; E. Smith & Neumann, 2005; van Reekum 
& Scherer, 1997). The mechanisms may use and produce any possible format of 
representations. Representations can be verbal-like (propositional or conceptual) or image-
like (perceptual or sensory). They can be localist and symbolic (one node refers to an 
appraisal value) or they can be distributed and subsymbolic (one appraisal value is 
represented as a pattern of activation over a set of nodes). 
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In sum, our differential definition of appraisal at the functional level makes it clear 
that appraisal should not be narrowed down to a non-automatic, rule-based mechanism that 
operates on verbal-like or symbolic codes, as is still too often assumed by critics of appraisal 
theories. Despite the fact that we allow the entire range of mechanisms and formats of 
representation to underlie appraisal and that we do not put a priori constraints on the 
conditions under which appraisal can operate, our definition of appraisal is not all-inclusive. 
This is because we reserve the term appraisal only for processes that deal with specific types 
of information captured in the appraisal factors proposed by appraisal theories. Determining 
which factors do or do not qualify as real appraisal factors is a work in progress. At this point, 
the existing proposals can be considered as working hypotheses that require further empirical 
research  
Individual appraisal theorists agree about a core set of appraisal factors such as goal 
relevance, goal congruence, expectancy or novelty, coping potential or control, agency, and 
intentionality, but they disagree about others such as intrinsic valence (see Table 29.1 in 
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Appraisal factors can be treated as categorical variables, with a 
discrete number of possible values (two or three), or as dimensional variables, with an infinite 
number of possible values. For example, in a categorical account, the factor goal congruence 
(i.e., whether a stimulus matches with goals or concerns) has the values goal congruent and 
goal incongruent whereas in the dimensional account, it has an infinite number of values 
ranging from totally goal incongruent to totally goal congruent. Some factors are necessarily 
categorical. For instance, agency (i.e., the cause of an event) has values such as self, other, 
and impersonal circumstances. Identifying a list of typical appraisal factors fits in a molecular 
approach toward appraisal. Lazarus and his collaborators (Lazarus, 1991; Smith and Lazarus, 
1993) combined the molecular approach with a molar one. In a molar approach, appraisal is 
treated as a unitary factor with a number of discrete values such as danger, insult, and 
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irrevocable loss ("core relational themes"). These molar values are often considered as 
summaries or gestalts of molecular values (Smith & Lazarus, 1993, p. 236). 
Appraisal Output 
As mentioned, the output of the appraisal process is a representation of one or more 
appraisal values (appraisals) that have specific effects on other components (motivational, 
somatic, motor, feeling). There are no a priori constraints on the format of this representation 
or the conditions under which they can exist. Representations of appraisal values are 
unconscious by default, but part of their content can become conscious. The part that does 
become conscious becomes part of the content of the feeling component (based on the idea 
that feelings are the reflection of the other components into consciousness, cf. infra). Only 
part of this conscious part is available for verbal report (see Scherer, 2009).  
Relations between Appraisal and Emotions or the Other Components 
Emotion theorists have proposed various kinds of relations between appraisal and 
emotion or the other components of emotion (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1993, 2007; 
Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Parkinson, 1997; Scherer, 2001, 2009). They have 
argued that appraisal (a) is a component of emotion (part-whole relation), (b) is a cause of the 
other components (causal relation), (c) is part of the content of the feeling component, (d) is a 
consequence of the other components (causal relation), (e) temporally co-occurs with the 
other components (contiguity relation), and (f) is part of the meaning of emotion labels 
(conceptual relation). We discuss each of these relations as well as the extent to which they 
are mutually compatible. 
Appraisal as a Component of Emotion 
In our componential definition of emotion, we presented appraisal as one of the 
components in an emotion. Appraisal in this sense is fairly uncontroversial (Frijda, 2007) but 
there may be disagreement about the proportion of emotions in which appraisal is a 
ROLE OF APPRAISAL IN EMOTION  9 
component. Theorists may think that appraisal is a component in (a) all, (b) most, or (c) some 
emotions. In other words, theorists may think that appraisal is a (a) necessary, (b) typical, or 
(c) occasional component of emotion. Most appraisal theorists side with the view that 
appraisal is a typical or even necessary component of emotion.  
Appraisal as a Cause of the Other Components 
Several appraisal theorists think that appraisal is not just a component of the emotion 
episode. They think it is also a cause of the other components. This means that appraisal 
comes first in the causal chain and that it drives the changes in action tendencies, 
physiological responses, expressive behavior, and feelings (see Figure 1 for an example of 
this approach). The word “first” should be nuanced because contemporary appraisal theorists 
build in the notions of recurrence and immediate efference. Recurrence means that changes in 
later components feed back to earlier components. Somatic and behavioral responses may 
produce a change of appraisal, either directly or indirectly (via a change in the stimulus). For 
example, an aggressive response may lead to an appraisal of high coping potential by making 
the person stronger (i.e., direct influence) or by making the opponent weaker (i.e., indirect 
influence). Because of recurrence, several emotional cycles may run in parallel. This is not 
incompatible with the idea that appraisal comes first, as long as appraisal comes first in each 
cycle. Immediate efference refers to the idea that the processes in early components can 
influence later components before they are entirely completed. Processes that are partially 
completed can influence other processes once they have produced a preliminary output.  
------- Figure 1 about here ------ 
Some theorists think appraisal causes the other components in all instances of 
emotions; they see appraisal as a necessary cause (e.g., Lazarus, 1991). Others think appraisal 
causes the other components in most, but not all, instances of emotions; they see appraisal as 
a typical cause (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). This brings us to the first criterion that we 
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propose for delineating the set of appraisal theories from other emotion theories: Appraisal 
theories consider appraisal to be at least a typical cause of the other components in emotions. 
Appraisal as Part of the Content of the Feeling Component 
Once a stimulus has produced changes in the components of appraisal, action 
tendencies, physiological responses, and behavior, aspects of the integrated representation of 
these changes surface into consciousness. Conscious aspects of appraisal are integrated with 
the representation of changes from other components (e.g., viscera-motor proprioception) and 
together they shape the content of the feeling component. What are the types of aspects that 
contribute to the content of feelings? In the case of the appraisal component, Lambie and 
Marcel (2002) have argued that not the appraisal process itself but (part of) the output of the 
appraisal process surfaces into feelings. As explained above, the appraisal process produces 
an appraisal output, which is a representation of appraisal values. This representation is 
generally unconscious but part of it can become conscious and hence contribute to the content 
of feelings. It may be noted, however, that the distinction between process and output is not 
so clear-cut when a process is considered on the functional level of analysis, that is, as the 
relation between an input and an output. Thus, it is possible that individuals are conscious of 
(a) the input (i.e., the stimulus), (b) the output of appraisal (i.e., appraisal values), and (c) the 
appraisal processes described on a functional level of analysis, as a relation between input 
and output (e.g., that a stimulus was appraised as goal incongruent and difficult to cope with). 
It is highly unlikely, however, that individuals have conscious access to processes described 
on the algorithmic or implementational levels of analysis (Moors & De Houwer, 2006).  
As mentioned above, the content of feelings is not only determined by appraisal but 
also by the other components in the emotion episode. As a consequence, the relation between 
appraisal and feelings is not linear. Aspects of the appraisal component may blend in with the 
other components so that it is difficult to disentangle the aspects that come from appraisal and 
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those that come from the other components. For example, when a person feels strong, this 
may stem from an appraisal of high coping potential (appraisal component) or from the 
tendency to destroy (motivational component). Disentangling the sources of feelings is 
further complicated by possible causal influences among components. An appraisal of high 
coping potential may cause the tendency to fight (conform to the idea that appraisal causes 
the other components). Turning it around, the tendency to fight may cause a person to 
appraise her coping potential as high (conform to the idea of recurrence).  
Individual components may differ with regard to the ease with which they are 
consciously accessed. It is important to keep in mind, however, that conscious access is not 
identical to ease of self-report. Some components (e.g., peripheral part of the somatic 
component) may be easy to feel but difficult to put into words.  
If one accepts that appraisal is a component of emotion and that aspects of all 
components are integrated and reflected in the content of the feeling component, it clearly 
follows that appraisal determines part of the content of the feeling component. If one accepts 
that appraisal is also a cause of the other components (motivational, somatic, motor), it also 
determines the content of the feeling component via its influence on the other components. In 
that case, appraisal is not a minor contributing factor, but the core determinant of feelings. 
This is the second criterion that we propose for delineating appraisal theories from other 
emotion theories. Appraisal theorists think of appraisal as the core determinant of feelings, at 
least in most emotion episodes, due to its direct and indirect impact. It may be noted that the 
notion of appraisal as part of the content of feelings is compatible but not redundant with the 
notion of appraisal as a component of emotion. This is because only part of appraisal is 
reflected into consciousness.  
Appraisal as a Consequence of The Other Components 
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Some theorists have emphasized the role of appraisal as a consequence of emotion (or 
of the other components). For example, Berkowitz (1990; Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004) 
has argued that an appraisal of agency and/or intentionality may occur as a consequence of a 
feeling of anger. Anger encourages people to search for someone to blame (an intentional 
agent). Here too, there can be different opinions about whether appraisal is a consequence in 
all, most, or only some emotion episodes.  
Theorists (e.g., Berkowitz, 1990) who emphasize the role of appraisal as a 
consequence of emotion have often treated it as an alternative to the role of appraisal as a 
cause of emotion. Yet, the roles of cause and consequence are not incompatible, as long as 
two separate appraisal processes are involved (or two phases in the same appraisal process). 
In a first step, one appraisal process (or phase) may cause the other components. In a second 
step, the other components may cause a new appraisal process (or phase) corresponding to 
what we called recurrence. Saying that appraisal is more often a consequence than a cause of 
emotion amounts to saying that the second step occurs more often than the first step. Several 
appraisal theorists have acknowledged that the first step often consists of a rudimentary form 
of appraisal (involving only the simplest appraisal factors or mechanisms) whereas the 
second step gives rise to a more complex form of appraisal (involving more sophisticated 
appraisal factors or mechanisms; Frijda, 1993). Even in these cases, appraisal does act as a 
cause and as a consequence of the other components.  
Appraisal as Merely Temporally Co-occurring with Other Components 
All the relations discussed so far imply that appraisal occurs in close temporal 
proximity (i.e., before, after, or simultaneously) with the other components. For the sake of 
completeness, we mention the possibility that appraisal occurs in close temporal proximity 
with the other components without there being any causal relations among the components. 
In theory, appraisal can precede the other components without causing them and it can follow 
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the other components without being caused by them. Even theorists who exclude appraisal as 
a component of emotion may still accept temporal co-occurrence between appraisal and the 
other components.  
Appraisal as Part of the Meaning of Emotion Labels  
Several authors (Frijda, 1993, Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001; Parkinson, 1997) have 
drawn attention to the fact that appraisal and emotion are conceptually related. Appraisal 
values are part of the meaning of vernacular emotion labels. For example, danger is part of 
fear, loss is part of sadness, and high coping potential and other-agency are part of anger. 
Once a person establishes a relation between two concepts, it becomes a sort of knowledge. 
This knowledge may or may not be activated during an emotional episode, and it may or may 
not have an influence on the other components. This knowledge may also be activated 
outside an emotion episode. The conceptual relation between appraisal and emotion may 
originally stem from any of the relations between appraisal and emotion described above 
(part-whole, causal, temporal co-occurrence), but it may also have other sources (e.g., 
culturally transmitted stereotypic schemes). Hence, knowledge about appraisals and emotions 
may reflect the actual co-occurrence of appraisals and emotions at some point in time or it 
may reflect an imagined co-occurrence. Like the other relations described above, the 
conceptual relation between appraisal and emotion may be considered as being necessary, 
typical, or occasional (Parkinson, 1997).  
Starting from the idea that the meaning of emotion words can be exhaustively 
described by profile values on all components (Scherer, 2005, pp. 709-712), Fontaine, 
Scherer and Soriano (in press) conducted an intercultural and cross-linguistic study involving 
35 datasets from 27 countries covering a total of 24 different languages. Native speakers 
indicated for 24 emotion words the probability with which 144 features representing all 
components would apply to a person described as experiencing the respective emotion. 
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Multiple discriminant analyses revealed that 31 appraisal features allowed the correct 
classification of 71% of the cases (after cross-validation). Adding features of the other 
components led to relatively small increases of the accuracy percentage: 40 action tendency 
features increased it to 75.4%, 18 bodily sensations and 26 motor expression features 
increased it to 80.9%, and 22 feeling features added nothing. The fact that appraisal explains 
the lion’s share of the variance and that all other components explain a relatively small share 
aligns with appraisal theories’ claim that appraisal drives changes in the other components. 
To summarize, appraisal theories and other emotion theories attribute several roles to 
appraisal. We have put forward two criteria to demarcate appraisal theories from other 
theories: Appraisal theories argue that appraisal is a typical cause of the other components in 
emotions, and because of this, they argue that appraisal is the core determinant of the content 
of feelings. In the next section, we explore the first criterion (that appraisal is a typical cause 
of the other components) in further detail, using illustrations from causal appraisal theories. 
After that, we identify the kinds of evidence that would be needed to support the causal claim 
and we review some of the existing empirical evidence. Given that the second claim (that 
appraisal is the core determinant of feelings) follows from the first claim, finding evidence 
for the first claim is essential for the second claim as well.  
Exploration of the Causal Claim 
The causal chain from stimulus to emotion can be split into two steps. The first step 
deals with the stimulus. In the second step, the output of the first step is translated into an 
emotion or the other emotional components. Appraisal theories have addressed both steps in 
the causal chain. The appraisal process takes place in the first step. Translation of the 
appraisal values into emotions or values of the other components takes place in the second 
step. The processes occurring in each of these steps can be considered at each of the three 
levels of analysis (functional, algorithmic, and implementational). In this chapter, we 
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consider hypotheses about the functional level, the algorithmic level, and the relation between 
the two levels. So far, there has been little systematic work on the implementational level for 
appraisal and its relation to the other levels (but see Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005; 
Scherer & Peper, 2001).  
Emotion Causation at the Functional Level 
At the functional level of analysis, appraisal theories propose hypotheses about the 
appraisal factors that are processed (first step) and about links between appraisal values and 
specific emotions or values of the other components (second step). Hypotheses about the first 
step are related to those about the second step because it is implicitly assumed that only those 
appraisal factors are processed (first step) that play a role in the causation of emotions or their 
components (second step). Hypotheses about the second step take appraisal values as the 
independent variables. These values may be of the molar (e.g., danger, loss, and insult) or the 
molecular kind (e.g., goal congruent, high coping potential, and other-agency). The 
dependent variables can be the occurrence, the intensity, and the quality of (a) an emotion or 
of (b) each of the other components (action tendencies, somatic responses, motor responses, 
and/or feelings). Actually, each of these components can be treated in a molar or a molecular 
way (see Table 1).  
--------- Table 1 about here ------- 
Many appraisal theories propose hypotheses about links between molecular appraisal 
values and entire emotions. For example, they predict that a pattern consisting of the 
molecular appraisal values of goal incongruent, high coping potential, and other-agency leads 
to anger (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Other appraisal theories have hypotheses about links 
between molecular appraisal values and the molar values of the other components. For 
instance, some theorists predict that a pattern consisting of the appraisal values of goal 
incongruent, high coping potential, and other agency leads to the tendency to attack. Few 
ROLE OF APPRAISAL IN EMOTION  16 
appraisal theorists have hypotheses about links between molecular appraisal values and 
molecular values of other components. Roseman (2001), for example, predicts that goal 
congruence leads to action tendencies characterized by approach, and that low coping 
potential leads to action tendencies characterized by adjustment of the self to the 
environment. Scherer (2001, 2009) and C. A. Smith (1989) predict (and investigate) links 
between molecular appraisal values and molecular values of facial and vocal expressions and 
physiological responses (see Table 2 for examples).  
------ Table 2 about here ------ 
Emotion Causation at the Algorithmic Level 
Appraisal theories have developed hypotheses about mechanisms and the format of 
the representations involved in (a) appraisal (first step) and in (b) the translation of appraisal 
values into emotions or values of the other components (second step). In addition, some 
appraisal theories (e.g., Scherer, 2009) present hypotheses about how to span the bridge 
between the functional and algorithmic levels.  
With regard to the first step, most appraisal theorists adopt a dual or triple mode 
model, accepting rule-based, associative and/or sensory-motor mechanisms as ones 
underlying appraisal. The associative mechanism is sometimes described as the spreading of 
activation from the representation of the stimulus to a representation of a pattern of appraisal 
values, but not many appraisal theories have detailed hypotheses about the structure of the 
associations and the format of the representations involved. As in other research domains in 
which a dual or triple mode view is endorsed, it is often assumed that the rule-based 
mechanism operates on verbal-like representations and that it is flexible but non-automatic 
whereas the associative and sensory-motor mechanisms are thought to operate on image-like 
representations and are rigid but automatic. These assumptions, however, have not been 
tested empirically and may not necessarily hold (cf. Moors, 2010). It is possible that both 
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rule-based and associative mechanisms can operate on all kinds of representations and that 
they can both take place in an automatic or a nonautomatic way. 
Another remark is that within the three classes of mechanisms presented here, there is 
still room for a variety of detailed proposals. For example, Scherer’s (2009) Component 
Process Model (CPM) predicts that the appraisal factors are often processed sequentially, in a 
fixed order. To be precise, the CPM assumes that the processes operate in parallel, but that 
they achieve preliminary closure (i.e., a reasonably definitive output) in a sequential way. 
The sequence assumption is based on phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and microgenetic 
considerations (Scherer, 1984, pp. 313-314; Scherer, Zentner, & Stern, 2004) and received 
support from experiments using brain activity, peripheral measures, and expression patterns 
(cf. Scherer, 2009). Other appraisal theorists posit that appraisal factors are processed in a 
partially sequential way or simultaneously. Figure 2 gives a schematic overview of the 
predictions of the CPM. The horizontal panel labeled “appraisal processes” (also called 
appraisal checks) shows the different groups of appraisal factors (with the individual 
appraisal factors within each respective group) organized in the predicted sequence (see 
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Scherer, 2001, 2009) together with the respective cognitive 
faculties (attention, memory, motivation, reasoning, self) that are recruited in these appraisal 
processes. The downward arrows represent the input of the cognitive faculties into the 
appraisal process (e.g., memory retrieval based on similarity) and the upward arrows 
represent a modification of these structures by the appraisal results (e.g., redirection of 
attention by a relevance appraisal). It may be noted that the sequence assumption is most 
pertinent for rule-based appraisal. In the case of associative appraisal, the appraisal values 
may become available in sequence or all at once.  
-------- Figure 2 about here -------- 
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With regard to the second step in the stimulus-to-components chain, there are two 
broad proposals. According to a first proposal, the appraisal values are integrated in a pattern 
before affecting the ensuing emotion (Smith & Kirby, 2001). According to a second proposal 
(cf. Scherer, 2009), each appraisal value has a separate influence on each of the other 
components in the emotion. According to a variant of this proposal, the influence of each 
appraisal value on the other components is mediated by the motivational component. In the 
CPM, for example (see Figure 1), each appraisal value triggers an action tendency value 
shaping the values of the somatic and expressive components. In Figure 2, the other 
components are presented in the horizontal panels below the appraisal panel. The bold 
downward arrows illustrate the assumption that the appraisal values immediately, 
sequentially, and cumulatively influence the values of all other components. The feeling 
component integrates the changes in all the other components. Feelings correspond to 
representations of the multicomponential changes in the central nervous system. The dotted 
upward arrows represent the changes fed back to the appraisal process (and the cognitive 
structures subserving the appraisal process) where they may produce modifications of prior 
appraisals (i.e., reappraisal). This recursive feature of the model makes it radically dynamic.  
The CPM clearly distinguishes between emotion episodes and the categorization or 
labeling of these episodes. The representation of the multicomponential changes triggered by 
certain appraisal outcomes in the central nervous system does not require, in and of itself, 
consciousness, categorization, or labeling. Rather, the latter processes are determined by 
many additional factors and the chosen category or label may represent only part of the 
emotion episode (see Scherer, 2009, pp. 1318-1323).  
The first proposal (that all appraisal values need to be integrated in a pattern before 
influencing the other components) is compatible with a basic emotions view in which each 
basic emotion corresponds to a specific appraisal pattern. Moreover, such a proposal is not 
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incompatible with a biological version of basic emotions theory, because each appraisal 
pattern may activate a brain circuit (i.e., affect program) dedicated to each basic emotion.  
The second proposal (that each appraisal value independently influences the other 
components), on the other hand, is incompatible with a biological version of basic emotions 
theory (Moors, in press; Scherer & Ellgring, 2007). Emotions are not latent constructs 
hardwired in our brains waiting to be triggered by the right appraisal pattern, like a lock that 
needs to be opened by the right key. They are emergent phenomena in the sense that their 
quality and intensity is shaped gradually with every additional piece of information resulting 
from each appraisal check. In line with this, the CPM does not assume the existence of a 
limited set of basic emotions, but considers the possibility of an infinite number of emotions 
(e.g., the generic term anger may cover annoyance, exasperation, fury, gall, indignation, 
infuriation, irritation, outrage, petulance, rage, resentment, and vexation). While other 
theories also accept the existence of families of emotions covering many shades, they do not 
explain how these shades come about. In contrast, appraisal theories explain the infinite 
variety by referring to the infinite number of possible appraisal configurations. We wish to 
note that the CPM does allow for so-called modal emotions (Scherer, 1994), such as anger 
and fear, that occur more frequently and engender more-or-less stereotypical responses to a 
frequently occurring type of event or stimulus (see Table 1 in Scherer, 2009).  
Empirical Support for the Causal Claim 
In this section, we examine the kind of empirical research that should be conducted to 
investigate the causal claim of appraisal theories. Before we do so, it is worth spending a few 
lines on what the term causation means. There are many approaches to causation. One 
approach that provides useful guides for the empirical study of causation is Mackie’s (1974) 
proposal that a cause C of an effect E is an insufficient but necessary condition in a set of 
conditions that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for E (short, INUS condition). For example, 
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dropping a lit cigarette in the woods is the cause of a fire if dropping the lit cigarette is in 
itself insufficient to cause the fire (other conditions are necessary like combustible material 
and oxygen), but it is a necessary part of a set of conditions (a set including the lit cigarette, 
the combustible material, and the oxygen) that is itself unnecessary (there may be other sets 
of conditions for fire, e.g., a set including a fire cracker, combustible material, and oxygen) 
but sufficient (when this set of conditions is present the fire is present as well). Appraisal is a 
cause of emotion when it is insufficient in itself for emotion (other conditions may be 
necessary like the condition that appraisal must have a certain output, e.g., goal relevant, goal 
congruent, goal incongruent, positive, negative, novel, or urgent), but it is a necessary part of 
a set of conditions that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for emotion. Based on this 
definition of causation, investigators who want to show that appraisal is a cause of emotion 
should find a set of conditions that is sufficient for emotion and demonstrate that appraisal is 
present in this set. In addition, they should demonstrate that the set is no longer sufficient 
when appraisal is eliminated from it. 
We argued that appraisal theories consider appraisal as a typical cause of emotion. 
Demonstrating that appraisal is a typical (let alone necessary) cause of emotion, however, is 
not a realistic aim of study. One cannot study most (let alone all) sets of conditions that are 
sufficient for emotion and demonstrate that appraisal is present in all these sets and that 
elimination of appraisal from these sets makes them insufficient. A more realistic aim is to 
demonstrate that appraisal is a cause of emotion (i.e., that there is one sufficient set of 
conditions in which appraisal is necessary), and preferably, to provide cumulative or 
converging evidence for this (i.e., that there are many sufficient sets of conditions in which 
appraisal is necessary). Emotion causation can be studied on all three levels of analysis. We 
focus here on ways to investigate emotion causation at the functional and algorithmic levels.  
Testing Causal Hypotheses at the Functional Level of Analysis 
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The claim that appraisal causes emotion entails that appraisal not only determines the 
occurrence of emotions but also their intensity and quality. In addition to the general claim 
that appraisal determines the occurrence, intensity, and quality of emotions, appraisal theories 
also make specific claims about the specific appraisal factors involved in each of these effects 
(occurrence, intensity, and quality). 
The general claim that appraisal causes emotions (with an intensity and quality) can 
be studied by comparing one set of conditions in which appraisal is present with another set 
in which appraisal is absent (independent variable) and by registering the presence or absence 
of emotion (dependent variable). To manipulate the presence or absence of appraisal, 
appraisal must be instantiated, that is, one must choose a certain pattern of appraisal values to 
be present or absent. Failure to find an effect does not ipso facto mean that appraisal does not 
cause emotions. It may also mean that the wrong pattern of appraisal values was chosen.  
The specific claims (about the specific appraisal factors involved in the occurrence, 
intensity, and quality of emotions) can be studied by manipulating the appraisal factors 
figuring in them and by measuring the presence or absence of emotions, their intensity, and 
their quality. Again, failure to find an effect of one of these appraisal factors means that the 
specific claim is false and requires adjustment, but not that the general claim is false as well. 
In the next sections, we discuss ways in which to manipulate appraisal processes and ways to 
measure the other components. For historical reasons, we first briefly review early studies in 
which appraisal was not manipulated but merely measured.  
Measurement of appraisal. Appraisals have been measured with self-report, assuming 
that people have conscious access to appraisal on a functional level of analysis. In recall 
studies, participants are asked to recall emotion episodes (e.g., anger) and to rate the 
respective appraisals (e.g., who caused the event; Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992; Roseman, 
Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Scherer, 1993). A few studies measured 
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appraisals in real life situations. For instance, Smith and Ellsworth (1987) studied students' 
appraisals before and after taking an exam. Scherer and Ceschi (1997) measured appraisals of 
airline passengers immediately after having registered lost luggage. While such self-report 
studies suggest the plausibility of the causal claim, experimental manipulation of appraisal is 
required to obtain empirical evidence. 
Manipulation of appraisal. Appraisal factors can be manipulated in a variety of ways: 
either (a) directly, with verbal stimuli that literally refer to appraisal values, or (b) indirectly, 
by manipulating stimuli in the expectation that participants will appraise them in a certain 
way, but without explicit verbal reference to appraisal values. In indirect methods, the to-be-
appraised stimuli can be (a) really present (e.g., a real dog appears), or (b) externally 
represented in visual (e.g., picture of a dog) or verbal form (e.g., the word “dog”).  
Examples of procedures in which real events are manipulated are experiments (a) 
presented as ability tests (McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009; Mikulincer, 1988; Kreibig, 
Gendolla, & Scherer, 2010; Kulik & Brown, 1979; Smith & Kirby, 2009; Smith & Pope, 
1992) or (b) construed as interactive games (e.g., ultimatum games; Harle & Sanfey, 2010; 
Yamagishi et al., 2009) in which participants compete with real (e.g., Bossuyt, Moors, & De 
Houwer, 2012; Cherek, Lane, & Pietras, 2003; McCloskey, Berman, & Coccaro, 2005) or 
virtual opponents (Kappas & Pecchinenda, 1999; Johnstone, van Reekum, Hird, Kirsner, & 
Scherer, 2005; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). In these experiments, participants encounter 
events that are (a) relevant or irrelevant for goals (Moors & De Houwer, 2001), (b) congruent 
or incongruent with goals (e.g., the goal to achieve, or to win a prize; Moors & De Houwer, 
2001; Smith & Pope, 1992), (b) pleasant or unpleasant (e.g., words, pictures, sound blasts, 
electroshocks, tastes, virtual enemies; Geen, 1978; Johnstone et al., 2005; Roseman & 
Evdokas, 2004), (d) easy or difficult to cope with (e.g., Cherek, Spiga, Steinberg, & Kelly, 
1990; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Geen, 1978; McCloskey, Berman, & Coccaro, 
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2005), (e) certain or uncertain (e.g., Roseman & Evdokas, 2004), (f) caused by themselves or 
by others (Bossuyt et al., 2012), and fair or unfair (e.g., Batson, 2007; Weiss, Suckow, & 
Cropanzano, 1999). In all these experiments, researchers expect that participants appraise the 
stimuli in the intended way.  
Procedures in which the to-be-appraised stimuli or events are not really present but 
externally represented in verbal (words or stories) or visual form (pictures or films) are 
scenario studies and recall studies. In scenario studies (e.g., Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, 
De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007; Robinson & Clore, 2001; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 
1998), participants are presented with fictitious events (verbal or visual) and they are 
instructed or expected to imagine that these events would happen to them. In recall studies, 
participants receive verbal instructions to retrieve events from their past. In both scenario and 
recall studies, appraisals can be manipulated directly or indirectly. In the direct case, 
instructions literally refer to appraisal values (e.g., “imagine that you have low power”, P. K. 
Smith & Bargh, 2008; “recall an event in which you had low power”, Fast & Chen, 2009; 
Galinsky et al., 2003; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003; Lammers, 
Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008). In the indirect case, events are described or depicted 
without explicit reference to appraisal values (e.g., de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 
2010; Kuppens et al., 2007) 
At least three issues are important to consider when choosing procedures for 
manipulating appraisal factors. A first issue is that of controlling for confounding variables. 
Procedures with real events in the laboratory allow for more control over confounding 
variables than those with imagined or recalled events. For instance, coping potential can be 
manipulated by leaving a door open or closed in a computer game or by telling that a door is 
open or closed in a verbal scenario. In the computer game, participants have no way to 
escape, whereas in the verbal scenario, they may imagine escape via a window. If we 
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compare scenario procedures of the indirect (in which events are described in an appraisal-
free manner) and direct type (in which events are described in appraisal terms), we argue that 
the former allow for more control over the confounding variables related to the concrete 
details of the events, whereas the latter allow for more control over confounding appraisal 
factors. For example, the scenario of hitting one’s head against the kitchen cabinet (i.e., 
indirect type) allows the researcher to control the concrete features of the event, but not 
whether the person appraises the event merely as goal incongruent or as also caused by 
another agent (e.g., when the kitchen cabinet is treated as an agent for a split second). The 
scenario of appraising another person as the cause of a goal-incongruent event (i.e., direct 
type) allows less control over the concrete features of the event (many concrete events can be 
imagined that fit this appraisal pattern), but more control over the appraisal factors (the event 
is appraised as goal incongruent and caused by another person).  
A second issue is the extent to which the processes induced by the manipulation 
resemble the processes induced by real emotion-eliciting events outside the laboratory. 
Compared to externally represented events, real events in the laboratory are more likely to 
induce the same processes as real events outside the laboratory. Many authors have suggested 
that externally represented events activate knowledge about the relation between appraisals 
and emotions whereas real events induce real emotion-eliciting processes (e.g., Parkinson, 
1997). The fact that externally represented events (e.g., films) can also elicit emotions raises 
the question whether the activation of knowledge differs from so-called real emotion-eliciting 
processes, and as a consequence, whether the emotions elicited by externally represented 
events are of a special kind (e.g., Levinson, 1990; Radford, 1985). There is reason to believe 
that the activation of knowledge is especially likely when verbal material is used.  
To summarize, the manipulation of real events has the advantage that there is control 
over confounding variables, but the disadvantage that one cannot be entirely sure that the 
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participants appraise the events in the way the researcher expects them to. This is not always 
a problem and it can partly be met by adding a manipulation check. The manipulation of 
externally represented events that refer explicitly to appraisal factors allows one to have more 
control over the appraisal factors at stake, but runs the risk of inducing processes (like the 
activation of conceptual knowledge) that are different from the ones induced by real events.  
Measurement of other components. Measurement of the other components in the 
emotion episode can be done with a variety of procedures: objective and subjective ones and 
direct and indirect ones. Objective measures produce responses that are verifiable by others; 
subjective measures do not (cf. Muckler, 1992). Examples of objective measures are ones 
producing reaction times or other aspects of motor responses, EEG signals, and skin 
conductance responses. Subjective measures rely on reports by internal (i.e., self-reports) or 
external observers, at least when the content of the reports is considered as the response (and 
not objective aspects like reaction times). Subjective measures are only suitable for constructs 
that are (to some extent) consciously accessible to the observer.  
Following De Houwer and Moors (2010), we call a measure direct when the 
researcher uses the responses as a direct read-out of the values of the to-be-measured 
variable. For example, self-reports of action tendencies (e.g., “I had the tendency to attack”, 
e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) directly deliver the values of the to-be-measured 
variable of action tendencies. Likewise, a heart rate monitor directly delivers the values of the 
to-be-measured variable of heart rate. We call a measure indirect when the researcher derives 
the values of the to-be-measured variable from the values of another variable that is assumed 
to be influenced by the to-be-measured variable. For example, motor responses can be used 
as an indirect measure of action tendencies (e.g., Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011), 
based on the assumption that motor responses are influenced by action tendencies.  
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Components referring to overt responses, like somatic and motor components are 
preferably measured with direct measures, either objective ones (heart rate, blood pressure, 
skin conductance, overt behavior) or subjective ones (self-reports of somatic and motor 
responses). Components referring to internal constructs, like action tendencies and feelings, 
cannot be measured with direct objective measures (they cannot be read out directly from 
responses that are verifiable by others). They can be measured with indirect objective 
measures (e.g., using behavior to infer the presence of action tendencies), direct subjective 
measures (e.g., self-reports of action tendencies and feelings, Frijda et al., 1989; de Hooge et 
al., 2010), and indirect subjective measures (e.g., using self-reports of behavior to infer the 
presence of action tendencies).  
Testing Causal Hypotheses at the Algorithmic Level of Analysis 
In addition to research about the functional level, there is also need to do research 
about the algorithmic level and about the link between both levels. In the present section, we 
consider empirical evidence for one specific hypothesis proposed by the CPM: that appraisal 
factors influence the other components in a sequential fashion. Various studies demonstrate 
that appraisal checks have a sequential influence on facial expressions and peripheral and 
central physiological activity. Lanctôt and Hess (2007) showed a sequential influence of 
intrinsic valence and goal congruence on (zygomaticus and corrugator activity measured with 
electromyography, EMG). Aue, Flykt, and Scherer (2007) showed sequential effects of 
appraisals on heart rate and facial muscle innervations. Delplanque et al. (2009) showed that 
the appraisal of an odour as novel or familiar produces earlier effects on facial expressions 
(using EMG) and physiological reactions (using electrocardiogram and electrodermal 
activity) than the appraisal of the odour as positive or negative. Grandjean and Scherer (2008) 
and Van Peer, Grandjean, and Scherer (2012) manipulated novelty, goal relevance, intrinsic 
valence, and goal congruence appraisals in visual stimuli and observed their sequential 
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influence on electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings (using topographical analyses of the 
event-related potentials and frequency-bands). Gentsch, Grandjean, and Scherer (2012) 
extended this approach showing that the coping potential check occurred after the goal 
congruence check. Empirical support for the sequence hypothesis strengthens the causal 
claim defended in this chapter. The observation that different appraisal factors affect the other 
components at different points in time suggests that they are supported by mechanisms with 
different latencies. This, in turn, suggests that appraisal is an intervening mental process and 
not merely a description of the stimulus situation.  
Conclusion 
There is now fair agreement among emotion theories that emotions are 
multicomponential episodes and that appraisal is a component in these episodes (Frijda, 
2007; Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, in press). The family of appraisal theories, 
however, goes beyond the facile inclusion of appraisal as one of many components in 
emotion episodes by arguing for a strong causal role of appraisal in determining the other 
components. As a consequence, appraisal is considered as a major determinant of the content 
of feelings.  
In a detailed exploration of the causal claim, we listed possible hypotheses about two 
steps in the stimulus-to-components chain (the step in which the stimulus is appraised and the 
step in which the output of appraisal influences the remaining components) at the functional 
and algorithmic levels of analysis.  
We discussed methods to investigate hypotheses of appraisal theories formulated at 
the functional level of analysis. The general claim that appraisal is a typical cause of emotion 
is difficult if not impossible to prove in a definitive way. To support the plausibility of this 
claim, however, appraisal researchers are invited to provide cumulative support for it. The 
specific hypotheses about the specific appraisal factors that determine the presence, the 
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intensity, and quality of emotions or components are easier to study, relatively speaking. We 
listed ways to manipulate appraisals and ways to measure other emotional components. For 
the manipulation of appraisal, we distinguished between direct and indirect methods, and 
between methods using real events and externally represented events. For the measurement of 
emotions or emotional components, we distinguished between objective and subjective 
methods and between direct and indirect methods. Each method for the manipulation of 
appraisal can be combined with each method for measuring emotions or components. 
Contemporary appraisal researchers not only try to answer questions at the functional level of 
analysis, but also at the algorithmic level. To illustrate this, we discussed recent empirical 
support for the sequence hypothesis of the CPM (Scherer, 2009).  
A central question in emotion research is how emotions come about, and what 
determines their intensity and quality. Appraisal theories take up the challenge by proposing 
and testing hypotheses about the nature of these determinants (in the form of appraisal factors 
and values) and by specifying detailed links between these determinants and their effects 
(values on the other components). Appraisal is presented as a mental process, one that is 
specifically concerned with the postulated appraisal factors. Thus, the appraisal factors are 
more than descriptors of the situations that elicit emotions; they are the types of information 
that are somehow processed by the organism. The question how they are processed is 
addressed in hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms and representations.  
By defending the causal role of appraisal in emotions, appraisal theories put 
themselves in a vulnerable position. Empirical proof for causation is never definitive (even in 
experimental studies), and alternative explanations always lie in wait. Many appraisal 
theorists accept other processes than appraisal as possible causes of emotions, but only in 
marginal cases. The difficulty to prove that appraisal is a cause of emotions, let alone a 
typical cause, is not in itself a reason to reject it or to put forward other processes as typical 
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causes. They too need to stand the test of causation. Unfortunately, many alternative emotion 
theories do not provide sufficiently precise hypotheses to allow rigorous empirical testing.  
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Table 1. Examples of molar and molecular values for (sub)-components of emotions.  





Goal Congruence: congruent/incongruent 




Tendency to Fight 
Tendency to Flee 
Tendency to Give In  
Level of Activity: active vs. passive 
Direction of Movement: toward vs. away from stimulus 
Direction of Fit: fit stimulus to self vs. fit self to stimulus 





















Facial Activity in terms of 
Action Units: mouth corners pulled up, inner eyebrows 
raised, nose wrinkle 


















Level of Activity: active vs. passive 
Direction of Movement: toward vs. away from stimulus 
Direction of Fit: Fit stimulus to self vs. fit self to stimulus 








Values of all other components reflected into consciousness 
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Table 2. Predicted effects of molecular appraisal factors on molecular values of other 
emotion components (see also Table 2; Adapted from Table 5.3 in Scherer, 2001) 
Appraisal 
values 
Examples of expected effects on Action Tendencies (AT), Physiological Responses 






PR: heart rate deceleration, pupillary dilatation 
EB: eyebrows and lids raised, jaw drop, gaze directed 





PR: heart rate deceleration, salivation, pupillary dilatation 
EB: lids up, open mouth and nostrils, lips part with corners pulled up 
       increase in low frequency voice energy, soft speech 




AT: defense response 
PR: heart rate acceleration 
EB: brow lowering, nose wrinkling, upper lip raising, nostril compression, gaze aversion 




PR: decrease in respiration and heart rate decrease, decrease in general muscle tone 




PR: increase in respiration and heart rate, strong increase in muscle tension 
EB: frowning, lids tightening, lips pressed together, chin raising 
       gaze directed; high voice pitch and loudness 
no or low 
control: 
AT: adjustment/withdrawal 
PR: decrease in respiration and heart rate, hypotonus of the musculature 
EB: lip corner depression, lips parting, jaw drops, lids droop, inner brow raises and brow 
       lowered, gaze aversion 
       low voice pitch and loudness 






PR: strong increase in respiration rate and depth, slight heart rate decrease, increase in 
       systolic and diastolic blood pressure, increased blood flow to head, chest, and hands 
       (reddening, increased skin temperature in upper torso), pupillary constriction; 
       balanced muscle tone, tension increase in head and neck 
EB: eyebrows contract,  lids tight, eyes narrow, lips tight and parted, bare teeth or lips 
       tight, pressed together, nostril dilation, stare 
       loud voice with low pitch, strong energy in entire frequency range 





AT: protection/ submission 
PR: extreme, faster, and more irregular respiration, strong increase in heart rate, increase 
       in pulse volume amplitude, vasoconstriction in skin (pallor, decreased skin 
       temperature), gastro-intestinal tract, and sexual organs, increase in blood flow to 
      striped musculature, stomach upset, goose bumps, sweating, trembling 
EB: brow and lid raising, mouth stretch and corner retraction 
       high pitched voice 
       protective hand/arm movements, fast locomotion or freezing 
  
ROLE OF APPRAISAL IN EMOTION  41 
Fig. 1. The causal, recursive relationship between emotion components as suggested by the 
CPM (Reproduced and adapted from Scherer, 2009) 
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Fig. 2. Predictions of the CPM on the sequential mechanisms involved in appraisal and their 
efferent effects on the various other components, highlighting the recursive and cumulative 
nature of the emotion episode (Reproduced and adapted from Sander et al., 2005) 
 
